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ABSTRACT
Data aggregation is an efficient mechanism to collect statistics of
data in wireless sensor networks. However, the shared-medium na-
ture of communication facilitates eavesdropping and packet tam-
pering/injection by adversaries. Hence, wireless sensor networks
pose both privacy and security concerns on data aggregation. In this
paper, we present SPDA—a secure and privacy-preserving data ag-
gregation technique. We utilize disjoint aggregation paths/trees to
collect data of interest, thus the base station can verify the integrity
of the aggregation result by comparing the result from different
paths/trees. To address data privacy, we cloak the privacy-sensitive
data by sliding and reassembling technique. We evaluate the SPDA
scheme in terms of capacity of privacy-preservation, communica-
tion overhead, and data aggregation accuracy. The evaluation is
conducted through both theoretical analysis and simulation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks are attractive to many potential ap-
plications from military surveillance to civilian usage. However,
the protocol design for real-world wireless sensor networks is very
challenging. First of all, sensor nodes usually have limited compu-
tation and communication resources. Though low-power wireless
devices may work collaboratively to fulfill certain tasks, each in-
dividual sensors cannot afford complex computation or large com-
munication load. Second, wireless sensors are are deployed in open
and/or hostile environments, where wireless sensors may be inca-
pable to provide reliable functions or compromised by malicious
adversaries. Hence, it is important to preserve the integrity of the
collected data. Third, as sensor network applications expand to
more and more civilian usage, such as wireless meter services to
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get sensitive measurements of everyday life, preserving data pri-
vacy becomes an increasingly important concern.
A sensor network is usually used to get particular attributes of
the investigated area and send the readings or statistical results to
the base station. Therefore, an important feature of sensor net-
works is the ability to answer queries about the data acquired by
the sensors. When handling queries, data aggregation can achieve
an order of magnitude reduction in communication compared to
centralized approaches which return all raw data to the base station
[1] . However, the information compression nature of data aggre-
gation poses additional challenges to secure and privacy-preserving
data aggregation in wireless sensor networks. In data aggregation,
an intermediate node may maliciously manipulate (modify, forge,
or discard) the aggregation values, so a single compromised node
is able to significantly alter the final aggregation value. It is hard
for a base station to verify the correctness of the aggregation result
without knowing individual sensor readings. Additionally, privacy-
preserving mechanisms may barricade the security measures, since
sensor nodes cannot enforce public surveillance with the privacy
concern.
Note that end-to-end encryption and/or decryption is not a good
candidate to achieve secure and privacy-preserving data aggrega-
tion in sensor networks. If end-to-end communications are en-
crypted, the intermediate nodes could not easily perform in-network
processing to get aggregated results. Castelluccia, Mykletun and
Tsudik propose to use additively homomorphic encryption in [2],
which allows efficient aggregation of encrypted data without de-
cryption involved in the intermediate nodes. However, the pro-
posed encryption scheme is malleable, so that the transformations
on the cipher-text will produce meaningful changes in the plain-
text. The malleability is an undesired property for an encryption
scheme, since it allows an attacker to modify the contents of a mes-
sage easily.
In despite of these challenges, we are in great demand of proto-
cols to reinforce both privacy and security (data integrity) of data
aggregation in large sensor networks. As an example, the advanced
metering systems for data collection and control on electronic power
grid [3] demonstrate such demand. Moreover, the advanced meters
could be used for several other purposes for economic viability. It
is crucial to preserve the integrity and confidentiality of data within
each application, while still permitting controlled cooperation be-
tween different applications.
Przydatek, Song and Perrig present SIA protocol in [4]. SIA ad-
dresses the integrity of the aggregation by constructing efficient
random sampling mechanisms and interactive proofs. Due the the
random sampling mechanisms, the final aggregation results accepted
by the base station may not be very accurate. Moreover, when
the sample size is large, the additional communication overhead
may cancel out the benefit from data aggregation in bandwidth con-
sumption. Yang, Wang, Zhu and Cao propose SDAP protocol [5]
for secure data aggregation in sensor networks using “divide-and-
conquer” and “commit-and-attest” principles. Similar to SIA, due
to the statistical detection, SDAP may not able to detect the attacks
which change the intermediate aggregation result mildly.
In privacy-preservation domain, Huang, Wang and Borisov ad-
dress the problem in a peer-to-peer network application in [6]. Privacy-
preserving data aggregation schemes in wireless sensor network en-
vironment have been studies in [7]. However, the work in privacy
preservation domain does not assume data manipulation attacks.
In this paper, we present a novel method SPDA (Secure and
Privacy-preserving Data Aggregation), to address the challenges
for additive aggregation functions, such as sum, count, average,
variance and other moment of the measured data.
In the SPDA scheme, we build node-disjoint aggregation trees
interweaving with each other in a sensor network. Since a node
can only be in a single aggregation tree, malicious node can only
pollute the aggregation result on a single tree. In this case, the
base station can easily verify the integrity of the aggregation re-
sults. To preserve the data privacy, a sensor hides its reading by
slicing it into pieces and sends encrypted data slices to different ag-
gregators within its vicinity. Upon receiving the pieces from sensor
nodes, aggregators calculate the intermediate aggregate values and
further aggregate them to the base station along the disjoint trees.
As long as the inputs to the disjoint trees are the same from each
sensor node, the final aggregation results should be the same from
two disjoint aggregation trees, if without node failure or packet
loss. Therefore, both privacy and data integrity can be preserved
by SPDA while aggregation is carrying out.
To our best knowledge, this work is the first to address both
security and privacy preservation of data aggregation in wireless
sensor networks. The proposed SPDA scheme is light-weighted in
terms of computation and communication. Moreover, our scheme
achieves almost 100% accuracy of the aggregation results in a rea-
sonable dense network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the background and requirements of secure and privacy-preserving
data aggregation in wireless sensor networks. Section 3 provides
our detailed scheme of SPDA. Section 4 evaluates the proposed
scheme by analysis and simulation. After that, Section 5 summa-
rizes the related work. We conclude our findings and lay out future
research directions in Section 6.
2. MODEL AND BACKGROUND
A wireless sensor network is deployed in a certain area to de-
tect the common phenomena, or answer queries about (or obtain
statistics of) the investigated objects. There are two observations
that promote the data aggregation techniques in wireless sensor
networks. First, there may be high redundancy in the raw data.
Hence, it is unnecessary to report the raw data to users. Second, in-
network processing can help to prune the unnecessary information,
thus save tremendous bandwidth. Therefore, many applications in
wireless sensor network are based on data aggregation techniques,
where the sensor network provides a condensed view of the physi-
cal environment to users.
2.1 Network Model
In this paper, a sensor network is modelled as a connected graph
G(V,E). A vertex v, v ∈ V in the graph represents a sensor node.
An edge e, e ∈ E represents a wireless link. As long as two sensors
are able to communicate directly, there exists an edge connecting
them in the graph.
Generally, there are three types of nodes in a data aggregation
protocol: base station, aggregator and leaf node. The base station
is the node where users initiate a query and the aggregation result
is destined. In this paper, we only consider a single base station
case. It is readily extensible to multiple base station cases. In data
aggregation protocols [1] [8] [5], a spanning tree (usually refer to
aggregation tree) root at the base station is constructed. The non-
leaf nodes, except the root, in the aggregation tree serve as inter-
mediate aggregators, which are responsible for forwarding queries
and combining answers from its children and forwarding a single
message of the intermediate aggregation result to its parent. Note
that any sensor node may serve as an aggregator. In the data ag-
gregation, a node decides whether of not to be an aggregator when
it hears the query either from the base station or forwarded by an
aggregator. Note that a node follows different rules to elect itself
as an aggregator in different protocols. If a node decides to be an
aggregator, then it continues forwarding the query. Upon receiving
intermediate aggregation results from its children, the aggregator
combines these results and sends the local intermediate result to
its parent. It is desired that all the sensor nodes forward the query
when the network is not dense enough. In this case, all the sensors
serve as aggregators.
2.2 Data Aggregation Function
We consider a network of N sensors. A generic aggregation
function is defined as y(t)  f(r1(t), r2(t), · · · , rN(t)), where
ri(t) is the individual sensor reading by node i at time t. Typi-
cal functions of f include sum, average, min, max and count. In
this paper, we focus on additive aggregation functions. It is worth
noting that using additive aggregation functions is not too restric-
tive, because it is the base of many statistics functions, such as
average, count, variance, standard deviation, and so on. For ex-
ample, to get the variance of all the sensing data ri(t), i ∈ V,
f(t) = E(r2i (t)) − E(ri(t))2 for i ∈ V, each sensor needs to
contribute three inputs as the original data in the data aggregation,
they are 1 (count), ri(t), and r2i (t). Without loss of generality, we
assume y(t)  f(d1(t), d2(t), · · · , dN (t)), where di(t) is a func-
tion of ri(t) and di(t) is viewed as the individual sensor input (or
virtual reading) in the rest of the paper.
2.3 Key Management Model
To prevent the eavesdropping and other malicious attacks by out-
siders, messages in a wireless sensor network may be encrypted and
authenticated. Substantial work [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] has been
conducted to set up secret keys between two sensor nodes. We do
not want to limit ourselves to any single key management scheme.
Instead, we assume each pair of sensor nodes share a secret key.
In SPDA, we only encrypt messages when individual sensors re-
port their privacy-sensitive data at the first mile to protect the data
privacy (in Section 3).
2.4 Attack Model
A malicious attacker can perform a wide variety of attacks to
break privacy and integrity of results. Different attackers are likely
to have different objectives. In this paper, we focus on defence of
the attacks in the following categories.
• Eavesdropping: In an eavesdropping attack, an attacker at-
tempts to obtain private information by either overhearing the
transmissions over its neighboring wireless links or gossip-
ing (colluding) with other sensor nodes to uncover the secret
of a certain node. Eavesdropping threatens the data privacy.
With privacy concern, each sensor node should only keep its
readings to itself.
• Data Pollution: In a data pollution attack, an attacker tam-
pers with the intermediate aggregation result. The purpose
of the attack is to make the base station accept the wrong
aggregation results, and thus make the improper decisions.
In this paper, we do not consider the attack where a sensor
node reports a false value instead of the real sensor reading.
As indicated in [16][5], the impact of such attack is usually
limited. Therefore, a more serious concern is the case where
a non-leaf node close to the root of aggregation tree is com-
promised.
• Node Failure: In a node failure, an aggregator may not re-
spond queries or not forward the intermediate aggregation re-
sults. In a reasonable dense network, not responding queries
is not very harmful. In this paper, we consider the misbe-
havior of an aggregator which stops forwarding aggregation
results. Malicious attacks may cause node failures. Or even
without malicious attacks, it is likely that some sensor nodes
fail to forward the aggregated results due selfishness or re-
source constraint.
2.5 Design Goal
The overarching design goal of this paper is to provide a secure
and privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme, which is robust
against eavesdropping, and capable to detect data pollution and
node failures. Therefore, the desired characteristics of a data ag-
gregation scheme should satisfy the following criteria:
1. Privacy-preservation: Privacy is one of the major obsta-
cles to apply the wireless sensor networks to civilian appli-
cations, where curious individuals may attempt to determine
more detailed information about their neighbors by eaves-
dropping on the communications of wireless meters. It is in-
creasingly important to develop privacy-preserving data ag-
gregation schemes to ensure data privacy against eavesdrop-
ping and gossiping by curious neighbors.
2. Data Integrity: Since data aggregation results may be used
to make critical decisions, a base station needs to attest the
integrity of the aggregated result before accept it. Therefore,
it is desired that data aggregation scheme has the ability for
integrity check.
3. Efficiency: Data aggregation achieves bandwidth efficiency
by using in-network processing. In integrity- and privacy-
preserving data aggregation schemes, additional communi-
cation overhead is unavoidable to achieve additional features.
However, we will keep the additional overhead as small as
possible.
4. Accuracy: An accurate aggregation result of sensor read-
ings is usually desired. Therefore we take accuracy as a cri-
terion to estimate the performance of integrity- and privacy-
preserving data aggregation schemes. To ensure the accuracy
of aggregation results, randomization techniques [17, 18, 19,
20] are not applicable.
3. SECURE AND PRIVACY-PRESERVING
DATA AGGREGATION PROTOCOL
3.1 Protocol Overview
Data aggregation is initiated by a base station, which broadcasts
a query to the whole network. Upon receiving the query, leaf nodes
report their readings to their aggregators (parents along the span-
ning tree rooted at the base station), and then aggregators perform
in-network processing and route the aggregated results back to the
base station. However, in most conventional data aggregation pro-
tocols, data integrity and privacy are not preserved at the same time.
To address privacy, we adopt Slice-Mix-AggRegaTe (SMART)
technique [7]. In SMART, each participating sensor node (either
a leaf node or an aggregator) hides its individual data by slicing
the data and sending encrypted data slices to different neighboring
aggregators1, then the aggregators collect and route aggregated re-
sults back to the base station. Due to the associative property of
addition, SMART is able to conceal the original sensor readings as
well as keep the aggregation efficient and accurate.
To achieve the integrity, we resort to redundancy check by con-
structing two disjoint aggregation trees. Each sensor node needs
to send its reading to both aggregation trees, and makes the inputs
to both trees equal. The disjoint aggregation trees perform data
aggregation individually. Therefore, data pollution attacks can be
detected at the base station by comparing aggregation results along
the disjoint aggregation trees. If the aggregation results agree with
each other, then the base station will accept the result. Otherwise,
the base station knows that there exist either data pollution attacks
or node failures, or both.
In this section, we present the details of the SPDA protocol.
There are three phases: tree construction, privacy-preserving data
report, secure data aggregation in SPDA as follows.
3.2 Disjoint Aggregation Tree Construction
In order to utilize redundancy to verify integrity of aggregation
results, we construct node-disjoint aggregation trees in the first
phase of SPDA. In this paper, we build two disjoint aggregation
trees. Assuming m is the number of disjoint aggregation trees,
m = 2. We call the two aggregation trees, red aggregation tree
and blue aggregation tree respectively. The disjoint aggregation
tree construction phase can be easily generalized to build multiple
aggregation trees (m > 2). However, to achieve good coverage of
disjoint trees when m > 2, the network must be very dense. In this
phase, each node, except the base station, takes one of the three
roles: red aggregator, blue aggregator or leaf node. The base sta-
tion is the root of both red aggregation tree and blue aggregation
tree, so it is both a red aggregator and a blue aggregator.
The disjoint tree construction follows the procedure illustrated
in Figure 1, where the dark colored solid nodes represent blue ag-
gregators and light colored solid nodes represent red aggregators.
First, the base station BS initiates a query by issuing a HELLO
message. Upon receiving the HELLO messages from both red and
blue aggregators, a node makes the decision on its role. A node
becomes a red aggregator with probability pr(0 < pr < 1), be-
comes a blue aggregator with probability pb(0 < pb < 1) and
0 < pr + pb ≤ 1), and becomes a leaf node with probability
1− pr − pb.
Note that if a node is unable to reach either red aggregators or
1Though a node only has one parent node (aggregator) in an ag-
gregation tree, it is very likely that the node is able to reach other
aggregators within its transmission range in a reasonable dense net-
work
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(c) As the disjoint tree construction pro-
cedure continues, we can form two dis-
joint aggregation tree.
Figure 1: Illustration of disjoint tree construction for k = 4
(hence p = 1 that all nodes serve as aggregators.)
blue aggregators within one hop, the node cannot send its data val-
ues directly to both colored aggregators. In order to achieve the
separation of data aggregation along the disjoint trees, red aggrega-
tors are not allowed to forward the data for blue aggregators, and
vice versa. Therefore, If a node never receives HELLO message
from either red or blue tree, the node does not participate in data
aggregation.
To make more nodes receive HELLO messages from both red
and blue aggregators, it is desired to balance the red aggregators
and blue aggregators in a given neighborhood. Hence, a node is
likely to choose red color, if there are more blue aggregators than
red aggregators in its neighborhood. A node can estimate the num-
ber of red/blue aggregators in its neighborhood from the received
HELLO messages. In this case, upon receiving HELLO massage
from at least one blue aggregator and at least one red aggregator, a
node waits for a certain period of time to get enough HELLO mes-
sages before it makes the decision on its color. Therefore, the node
can have a good estimation of colors of its neighbors, and selects its
color to maximize the chance that other nodes will receive HELLO
messages both red and blue aggregators. We will show that only a
very small portion of nodes do not participate the data aggregation
in our scheme when the network is dense enough (in Section 4).
If a node becomes a red/blue aggregator, it will join the corre-
sponding red/blue aggregation tree and forward the HELLO mes-
sage to its neighbors; otherwise, the node is a leaf node. As this
procedure goes on, disjoint aggregation trees, red tree and blue tree,
are constructed. In SPDA, the following properties are desired:
• The disjoint aggregation trees are interweaved with each other.
Therefore almost every node can find a blue aggregator and
a red aggregator in its neighborhood. Since if a node does
not have a red aggregator or blue aggregators in its neigh-
borhood, the node cannot participate the data aggregation. In
order to have more nodes participate the data aggregation,
thus the aggregation result is more accurate, both aggrega-
tion trees should cover network as much as possible. In this
case, we should have enough number of aggregators.
• On the other hand, in a very dense network, we desire that
only a portion of nodes serve as blue or red aggregators.
Since leaf nodes do not need to forward HELLO message and
intermediate results to its parents, we can reduce the band-
width consumption by reducing the number of aggregators.
To ensure these two contradictory properties, we adopt adaptive
strategy to determine pr and pb for each individual node according
to the number of HELLO messages the node received from red ag-
gregators and blue aggregators. The value pr+pb should be larger,
if a node gets a smaller number of HELLO messages. Therefore,
we can get better coverage of the aggregation tree. Also, if a node
hears more HELLO messages from red aggregators than from blue
aggregators, the node will take larger chance to be a blue aggre-
gator to balance the blue and red aggregation trees. Therefore, we
can determine pr and pb accordingly,
pr = p
Nblue
Nblue +Nred
,
pb = p
Nred
Nblue +Nred
. (1)
where Nblue is the number of HELLO messages from the blue ag-
gregators, and Nred is the number of HELLO messages from the
red aggregators. p is the probability that a node becomes an aggre-
gator (either red or blue), hence p = pr + pb. We can determine
value p as follows
p =
{
k
Nblue+Nred
, if (Nblue +Nred) > k
1 , otherwise.
In the above equation, k(k ≥ 2) is predetermined parameter.
Value k balances the coverage of the aggregators and communi-
cation overhead. If k is large, then all nodes are aggregators. If
k is small, some nodes in the network may not be covered by ag-
gregation trees. The compelling features of using a fixed k value
are its simplicity and its inherent adaptability to network density.
That is, in a dense network, a portion of nodes are aggregators; in
a non-dense network2, all nodes are aggregators. In a reasonable
dense network, we can reduce Equation (1) to Equation (2) below
for simplicity.
pr = pb = 0.5 (p = 1). (2)
To ensure the security of data aggregation results, the disjoint
tree construction protocol should guarantee that a node cannot be
in both blue tree and red tree, so that the constructed aggregation
trees are node-disjoint. Though it is possible that an adversary may
intent to send two HELLO messages with different colors. Such
behavior can be easily detected by its neighbors due to the shared-
medium nature of wireless links. Therefore, the adversary can be
excluded from both aggregation trees.
3.3 Privacy-preserving Data Report
To preserve the privacy in data aggregation, sensors need to hide
the their original readings in the first hop data reporting. In SPDA,
each sensor hides its reading by slicing it into pieces and randomly
sends encrypted data slices to its neighboring aggregators. Then ag-
gregators assemble the received data and treat the assembled data
as their own readings. Then aggregators follows aggregation pro-
cedure described in Section 3.4 to route the aggregated result to the
base station. Privacy-preserving Data Report phase includes two
steps: data slicing and data assembling.
3.3.1 Slicing
First, a node needs to randomly select l red aggregators and l
blue aggregators from its neighboring nodes (including itself). If
a node itself is a red aggregator, then it always selects itself and
l−1 other red aggregators. Then the node randomly slices the data
into l pieces and send a piece to each of the selected neighboring
red aggregators including itself. The node also slices the original
reading into l pieces independently to the previous l slices, and
then sends a piece to each of the selected blue aggregators in the
neighborhood. Totally, each node takes 2l − 1 transmissions in the
slicing step. Note that when nodes send the sliced data pieces to
their neighbors, link level encryption is needed. Without encrypting
sliced pieces, an adversary is able to eavesdrop all the transmissions
by a given sensor node due to the shared-medium nature of wireless
links. Hence, the adversary can easily recover the original data of
that node3.
Figure 2 depicts the slicing step at node i, assuming node i is a
red aggregator. We denote d(i) as the private data at node i, and dij
as a slice of data sent from node i to node j. Note dii is kept locally
at node i, no transmission is needed for dii. For nodes to which
node i does not send any slice, dij = 0. The final aggregation
result is expressed as
2Note that in a sparse network, even if all the nodes are aggrega-
tors, the coverage is not good. So SPDA requires adequate network
density.
3In TAG, even if the link level encryption is used, neighbors of leaf
nodes can easily know the original data held by the leaf nodes.
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Figure 3: Assembling at node j
f =
N∑
i=1
d(i) =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 dij
2
. (3)
Let B stands for the blue aggregator set, and R stands for the red
aggregator set. Then
f =
N∑
i=1
d(i) =
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈B
dij =
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈R
dij . (4)
3.3.2 Assembling
When a node j receives an encrypted slice, it decrypts the data
using its shared key with the sender. Upon receiving the first slice,
the node waits for a certain time, which guarantees that all slices
of this round of aggregation are received. Then, it sums up all the
received slices r(j) =
∑N
i dij , where dij = 0, if node i does
not send a sliced data to node j. Figure 3 describes the assembling
step, where r(j) = dvj + duj + dwj + dxj + dyj + dzj + djj .
After the assembling, node j treats r(j) as its data reading in the
secure data aggregation phase (in the next section).
3.4 Secure Data Aggregation
Now, two disjoint aggregation trees have been constructed, and
aggregators hold an assembled data for data aggregation. The se-
cure data aggregation just needs to follow the standard aggregation
protocol along two disjoint trees: When a node gets all data slices,
it forwards a message of the sum addressed to its parent (the aggre-
gator of the same color with the node). The parent then forwards
the message along the tree. Eventually the aggregation reaches the
root (base station). When there is no attack, it is easy to derive that
∑
j∈B
r(j) =
∑
j∈B
(
N∑
i=1
dij
)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈B
dij =
N∑
i=1
d(i) = f. (5)
Similarly,
∑
j∈R
r(j) =
∑
j∈R
(
N∑
i=1
dij
)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈R
dij =
N∑
i=1
d(i) = f. (6)
Since not any single node is on two aggregation trees, if a node
inserts or alters the intermediate aggregation value, the aggrega-
tion results from different trees will be different. Therefore, at the
base station if the aggregation results from different trees agree
with each other:
∑
j∈B r(j) =
∑
j∈R r(j), then the base station
will accept the aggregation result; otherwise, reject it.
4. EVALUATION
4.1 Theoretical Analysis
4.1.1 Coverage of Aggregation Trees
In SPDA, a sensor node reports its reading to the base station by
aggregation only when the sensor node is able to reach both red and
blue aggregation trees within one hop. Otherwise, the sensor node
does not contribute its reading. In the case that a node cannot reach
both aggregation trees, the node is disconnected from the base sta-
tion. If a node is connected to the base station, the node is covered
by aggregation trees. We define Φ(G) as the probability that all
the nodes in graph G are covered by both aggregation trees. The
coverage of aggregation trees implies the accuracy of aggregation
results, since if the coverage is poor, then a large number nodes
cannot contribute their readings to the aggregation result.
Consider a random graph G(N, r), where N is number of nodes
and r is the transmission range of a node. As shown in [21], as
N is large, G(N, r) is connected if and only if there is no isolated
nodes (nodes with degree zero). Therefore, if we randomly assign
red or blue color to nodes in the graph G(N, r), assuming X as the
number of nodes which are isolated from either blue nodes or red
nodes, then
Φ(G) = P (X = 0). (7)
Define Xi as the indicator variable of whether node i has both blue
and red neighbors within one hop distance, so
Xi =
{
0, i has both blue and red neighbors;
1, otherwise. (8)
As network size is large enough, {Xi} can be approximated to
identical independent distribution (IID). Therefore, the total num-
ber of nodes which are isolated by either of the aggregation tree
is X =
∑N
i=1Xi. Denote di as the number of physical neigh-
bors of node i. The probability that i is isolated by red aggregation
tree is given as pdib . Similarly, i is isolated by blue aggregation
tree with probability pdir . Therefore, the probability that a node is
surrounded by all blue neighbors or red neighbors is:
pi = 1− (1− pdib )(1− pdir ). (9)
pi is the probability that a node i is isolated by either blue nodes or
red nodes, thus pi = P (Xi = 1). Since X =
∑N
i=1Xi. Applying
Markov Inequality P (X ≥ 1) ≤ E[X] =∑Ni=1 pi, we can obtain
the lower bound of Φ(G).
Φ(G) ≥ 1−
N∑
i=1
pi. (10)
This bound is tight for small pi values, which holds for dense net-
works, where di is large. As an example, consider a d-regular
graph, assuming pb = pr = 0.5, we have Φ(G) ≥ 1−N(1− 122d )
according to Equation (9). Therefore, Φ(G) ≥ 0.999 for N =
1000 and d = 10. We can conclude from Equation (10) that the
coverage of aggregation trees are very good for dense networks.
4.1.2 Communication Overhead
Figure 4 summarizes the communication messages sent and re-
ceived by each node in data aggregation under TAG and SPDA re-
spectively. In TAG, each node sends two messages to answer a
query: a HELLO message and a message for intermediate result.
In SPDA, additional 2l − 1 messages are introduced by slicing the
original privacy-sensitive data. Hence, totally 2l + 1 messages are
sent by each node. We can conclude that the communication over-
head ratio of SPDA to TAG is 2l+1
2
, where l the number of pieces
that a node slices its private data.
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Figure 4: Communication messages
4.1.3 Capacity of Privacy-preservation
As illustrated in Section 3.3, SPDA achieves privacy-preservation
by slicing the original data. In SPDA we use link level encryption
to prevent the slices data pieces from being overheard by an adver-
sary. If an eavesdropper gets enough data slices, it can reassem-
ble the slices and obtain the original data. According to different
assumptions and design goals, sensor networks may use different
types of key management and encryption schemes. One of the mer-
its of SPDA protocol is that SPDA does not assume any particular
key management scheme. In spite of the encryption, there are two
reasons that cause the privacy violation:
• Under some key distribution schemes (e.g. random key pre-
distribution [9] [10]), two neighboring nodes share a com-
mon key for communication. However, a third node may
also hold the key and is able to decrypt messages between
the two nodes.
• An attacker compromises multiple neighbors of a node and
gets the shared keys with the node. In this case, the attacker
may decrypt enough slices of data sent by a node, hence ob-
tain the original data.
In general, we assume px as the probability that an attacker breaks
the security of a given link. Then we concern the capacity of
privacy-preservation at a certain node i. The capacity is represented
by the probability P idisclose(px), which is the probability that node
i discloses its reading to someone else under a given px.
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Figure 5: Capacity of privacy-preservation in SPDA
Assuming a node slices the original reading into l pieces, to re-
veal the privacy-sensitive data held by a node i, an attacker needs
either to break l outgoing links, when node i sends l slices to ag-
gregators of different colors; or to break l − 1 outgoing links and
all of the incoming links as well, when node i sends l − 1 slices to
aggregators of the same color (in this case one of the slices is kept
locally at node i). Denote E[nl(i)] as the expected number of in-
coming links of node i. Then E[nl(i)] =
∑
j∈Neighbor(i)
(2l−1)
dj
,
where Neighbor(i) is the set of node i’s one hop neighbors, and
dj is the physical degree of node j. We conclude that
P idisclose(px) = 1− (1− plx)(1− pl−1+E[nl(i)]x ). (11)
As an example, let us consider a d-regular network (d >> l), where
E[nl(i)] = 2l − 1. For l = 3, d = 10 and px = 0.1, the prob-
ability that for privacy violation is P idisclose(0.1) = 0.001. For a
random network topology, the average of Pidisclose(px) is defined
as Pdisclose(px) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 P
i
disclose(px), which is much larger
than that in regular graph.
Figure 5 plots Pdisclose(px) over px, when 1000 sensor nodes
are distributed in a square area, and the average degree of a node
is 7 and 17 respectively. We can see that the privacy preservation
capacity of SPDA is insensitive to network density. We also notice
that although Pdisclose(px) is smaller for l = 3 than that for l = 2,
the difference is not tremendous. Since the privacy preservation
performance for l = 2 is good enough, and additionally, a larger l
yields larger overhead, we recommand l = 2 in SPDA.
4.1.4 Capable to Detect Data Pollution and Node
Failures
In SPDA, encryption is a necessity for privacy-preservation. How-
ever, no encryption or decryption is needed to achieve the integrity
when there exists data pollution or node failures. SPDA is able to
detect multiple attackers as long as they do not collude with each
other. Here we utilize redundancy to verify the integrity by con-
structing disjoint aggregation trees. Any individual attackers may
manipulate the intermediate aggregation results along one aggrega-
tion tree, but the attackers cannot pollute the data on the other tree.
When the base station gets the aggregation results from both aggre-
gation trees, say Sb and Sr , it accepts the results if |Sb−Sr| ≤ Th.
Th is usually not zero, because data loss may occur due to colli-
sions. The denser the network is, the larger Th should be, since
more contention and collision occur in a denser network.
4.2 Simulation Results
SPDA employs redundancy for integrity and data shredding for
privacy. When comparing with standard data aggregation proto-
cols, say TAG, SPDA achieves two important features, integrity and
privacy, at the cost of communication overhead. We provide the an-
alytical results regarding the aggregation performance in 4.1. Next,
we will assess the performance of SPDA by simulation. In our ex-
periments, sensor nodes are randomly deployed over a 400meters
× 400meters area. The transmission range of a sensor node is 50
meters and data rate is 1 Mbps.
4.2.1 Communication Overhead
We implement TAG and SPDA in ns-2 simulator. Figure 6 shows
the communication overhead of TAG, SPDA without slicing (l =
1), and SPDA with l = 2. The simulation verifies our theoreti-
cal conclusion that when we slice the data into l pieces, the total
bandwidth consumption is around 2l+1
2
times of that in standard
TAG protocol. When we deploy less than 300 sensors in the 400m
× 400m square, the average degree is less than 14. Such a net-
work density is relatively low. In this case some sensor nodes may
not receive the HELLO message, some nodes may not have enough
red and blue aggregators in their one hop neighborhood to send the
sliced data. Therefore, they cannot participate the data aggregation
according to SPDA protocol. So the total bandwidth consumption
is low when N < 300. This also explains why the accuracy under
SPDA is poor as shown in Section 4.2.2, when network density is
low (N < 300). To show the effect of network density on commu-
nication overhead and accuracy metrics, Table 1 summarizes the
average node degree according to a given number of nodes on a
400meter × 400meter square.
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Table 1: Network size v.s. network density
Number of nodes 200 300 400 500 600
Average degree 8.8 13.7 18.6 23.5 28.4
4.2.2 Coverage and Accuracy
When there is no data loss in the data aggregation, SPDA yields
100% accurate aggregation results. However, in a real sensor net-
work data loss is inevitable due to the following reasons:
1. In disjoint tree construction stage, if the network density is
low, then some nodes may be unreachable by both red and
blue aggregation trees. In this case, those nodes do not par-
ticipant in the data aggregation. Thus, some data is missing
in the final aggregation result.
2. In the data slicing stage, assuming each reading is sliced into
l pieces, if a red node cannot find l − 1 red neighbors and l
blue neighbors within one hop, the node does not participate
the data aggregation. Hence, the data held by such a node get
lost.
3. In disjoint tree construction, slicing, and data aggregation
stages, the data loss may be caused by collision in wireless
channels.
Figure 7 shows the percentage of nodes which participate in the
data aggregation. Figure 8 demonstrates the accuracy metric of
SPDA comparing with TAG. We define the accuracy metric as the
ratio of the collected sum by a given data aggregation protocol to
the real sum of all individual sensors. A higher accuracy value
means the collected sum using the specific aggregation scheme is
more accurate. We use value 1.0 representing the ideal situation,
where there is no data loss. Factor 1) and factor 2) resulting in data
loss are embodied in Figure 7. All three factors are reflected in
Figure 8. Due to the similarity of Figure 7 and Figure 8, we con-
clude that factor 1) and 2) are dominating factors to cause data loss
in sparse network. However, when average degree of a network is
large enough, factor 3) is the major reason for data loss, which is
very small though (usually less 5%). From Figure 7, we can also
conclude that in order to achieve excellent accuracy under SPDA
with the recommended parameter l = 2, the average network den-
sity should be larger than 18.
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5. RELATED WORK
LeMay, Gross, Gunter and Garg summarize the functional char-
acteristics of wireless metering sensors and categorizes attackers in
[3]. Both privacy and security are concerns in the given scenar-
ios. To prune redundant messages to save bandwidth and energy,
previous work [1, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28] address data aggre-
gation with the assumption that all sensors are working in trusted
and friendly environment. However, in reality, sensor networks
are likely to be deployed in an untrusted environment, where links,
for example, can be eavesdropped. An adversary may compromise
cryptographic keys and manipulate the data.
Previous work [4, 5, 29] investigate secure data aggregation against
the adversaries who try to tamper the intermediate aggregation re-
sult. To reinforce security in sensor network, communication should
be encrypted and authenticated. Many papers study how to set up
secret keys between sensor nodes to bootstrap secure communica-
tion, such as [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 8]. For encrypted data,
an aggregator has to decrypt each received message, then aggre-
gate the messages according to the corresponding aggregation func-
tion, and finally encrypt the aggregation result before forwarding
it. It is fairly expensive and complicated to perform “decryption-
aggregation-encryption” procedure for data aggregation. As a re-
sult, [30] and [2] propose homomorphic stream ciphers, that allow
efficient aggregation of encrypted data without decryption. How-
ever, due to the malleability of additive homomorphic encryption,
an attacker may produce meaningful changes in the original data.
Huang, Wang and Borisov propose a privacy-preserving peer-
to-peer troubleshooting scheme using PeerPressure in [6]. They
constructed a friends peer-to-peer overlay to gather PC configura-
tion samples using history-less random walk, during which search
is carried out simultaneously with secure parameter aggregation for
troubleshooting. Privacy-preservation has also been studied in the
data mining domain [17, 18, 19, 20]. Two major classes of schemes
are used. The first class is based on data perturbation (randomiza-
tion) techniques. In a data perturbation scheme, a random number
drawn from a certain distribution is added to the private data. Given
the distribution of the random perturbation, recovering the aggre-
gated result is possible. At the same time, by using the random-
ized data to mask the private values, privacy is achieved. However,
data perturbation techniques have the drawback that they do not
yield accurate aggregation results. Furthermore, as shown by Kar-
gupta et al. in [19] and by Huang et al. in [20], certain types of
data perturbation might not preserve privacy well. Another class
of privacy-preserving data mining schemes [31, 32, 33] is based on
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) techniques [34, 35, 36].
SMC deals with the problem of a joint computation of a function
with multi-party private inputs. SMC usually leverages public-key
cryptography. Hence SMC-based privacy-preserving data mining
schemes are usually computationally expensive, which is not ap-
plicable to resource-constrained wireless sensor networks.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Data aggregation is an important technique to save communi-
cation bandwidth for data collection in wireless sensor networks.
With more and more applications of wireless sensor networks in
various domains, the integrity and privacy of the collected data are
becoming crucial. However, it is a challenging to design secure and
privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols in large sensor net-
works when some nodes may be malicious. We propose the SPDA
scheme, using disjoint trees for data aggregation, hence, the base
station can tell whether or not the collected data is polluted by in-
termediate aggregators. To protect the privacy of individual sensor
readings, we utilize slicing technique to hide the original privacy-
sensitive data. To balance the communication overhead and the
capability of privacy preservation, we suggest l = 2 in SPDA pro-
tocol. A notable property of SPDA is that it is not a sampling or
approximation based protocol, so we can get accurate aggregation
result for a reasonable dense network. Simulations show that when
the average degree of a network is larger than 18, the aggregation
accuracy is very high (around 99% accuracy). The proposed SPDA
protocol is light-weighted in terms of computational complexity
and communication overhead. When sensors aggregate their inter-
mediate results along disjoint aggregation trees, no authentication
is needed. To our best knowledge, this work is the first to address
both security and privacy preservation of data aggregation in wire-
less sensor networks.
In the future, we will investigate secure and private-preserving
data aggregation schemes under collusive malicious attacks. We
will also study privacy-preserving schemes for more general ag-
gregation functions.
7. REFERENCES
[1] S. Madden, M. J. Franklin, and J. M. Hellerstein, “TAG: A
Tiny AGgregation Service for Ad-Hoc Sensor Networks,”
OSDI, 2002.
[2] C. Castelluccia, E. Mykletun, and G. Tsudik, “Efficient
Aggregation of Encrypted Data in Wireless Sensor
Networks,” Mobiquitous, 2005.
[3] M. LeMay, G. Gross, C. A. Gunter, and S. Garg, “Unified
architecture for large-scale attested metering,” in proceedings
of HICSS-40, January 2007.
[4] B. Przydatek, D. Song, and A. Perrig, “SIA: Secure
Information Aggregation in Sensor Networks,” In Proc. of
ACM SenSys, 2003.
[5] Y. Yang, X. Wang, S. Zhu, and G. Cao, “SDAP: A Secure
Hop-by-Hop Data Aggregation Protocol for Sensor
Networks,” ACM MobiHoc, 2006.
[6] Q. Huang, H. J. Wang, and N. Borisov, “Privacy-preserving
friends troubleshooting network,” in Symposium on Network
and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS), San Diego, CA,
Feburary 2005.
[7] W. He, X. Liu, H. Nguyen, K. Nahrstedt, and T. Abdelzaher,
“PDA: Privacy-preserving Data Aggregation in Wireless
Sensor Networks,” UIUC Department of Computer Science
Techniqual Report UIUCDCS-R-2006-2773, September
2006.
[8] A. Mahimkar and T. Rappaport, “SecureDAV: a secure data
aggregation and verification protocol for sensor networks,”
GLOBECOM, 2004.
[9] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, “A key-management scheme
for distributed sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 9th
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, November 2002, pp. 41–47.
[10] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Random key
predistribution schemes for sensor networks,” in IEEE
Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, 2003, pp.
197–213.
[11] S. Camtepe and B. Yener, “Combinatorial design of key
distribution mechanisms for wireless sensor networks,” in
Proceedings of 9th European Symposium On Research in
Computer Security (ESORICS 04), 2004.
[12] W. Du, J. Deng, Y. S. Han, and P. K. Varshney, “A pairwise
key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks,” in
Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), October 2003, pp. 42–51.
[13] D. Liu and P. Ning, “Establishing pairwise keys in
distributed sensor networks,” in Proceedings of 10th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS03), October 2003, pp. 52–61.
[14] S. Zhu, S. Setia, and S. Jajodia, “LEAP: Efficient security
mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks,” in
Proceedings of 10th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS03), October 2003, pp.
62–72.
[15] M. J. Miller and N. H. Vaidya, “Leveraging Channel
Diversity for Key Establishment in Wireless Sensor
Networks,” in IEEE INFOCOM, 2006.
[16] L. Hu and D. Evans, “Secure Aggregation for Wireless
Networks,” In Workshop on Security and Assurance in Ad
hoc Networks, January 2003.
[17] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant, “Privacy preserving data
mining,” in ACM SIGMOD Conf. Management of Data,
2000, pp. 439–450.
[18] A. Evfimievski, R. Srikant, R. Agrawal, and J. Gehrke,
“Privacy Preserving Mining of Association Rules,” in
Proceedings of The 8th ACM SIGKDD International
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, July
2002.
[19] H. Kargupta, Q. W. S. Datta, and K. Sivakumar, “On The
Privacy Preserving Properties of Random Data Perturbation
Techniques,” in the IEEE International Conference on Data
Mining, November 2003.
[20] Z. Huang, W. Du, and B. Chen, “Deriving Private
Information from Randomized Data,” in Proceedings of the
ACM SIGMOD Conference, June 2005.
[21] M. D. Penrose, “On k-connectivity for a geometric random
graph,” Source Random Structures & Algorithms archive,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York, NY, USA, vol. 15(2), pp.
145–164, September 1999.
[22] C. Itanagonwiwat, R. Govindan, and D. Estrin, “Directed
Diffusion: A Scalable and Robust Communication Paradigm
for Sensor Networks,” MobiCom, 2002.
[23] C. Intanagonwiwat, D. Estrin, R. Govindan, and
J. Heidemann, “Impact of Network Density on Data
Aggregation in Wireless Sensor Networks,” In Proceedings
of the 22nd International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems, 2002.
[24] A. Deshpande, S. Nath, P. B. Gibbons, and S. Seshan,
“Cache-and-query for wide area sensor databases,”
SIGMOD, 2003.
[25] I. Solis and K. Obraczka, “The impact of timing in data
aggregation for sensor networks,” ICC, 2004.
[26] T. Abdelzaher, T. He, and J. Stankovic, “Feedback Control of
Data Aggregation in Sensor Networks,” 43rd IEEE
Conference on Decision and Control, December 2004.
[27] J.-Y. Chen, G. Pandurangan, and D. Xu, “Robust
Computation of Aggregates in Wireless Sensor Networks:
Distributed Randomized Algorithms and Analysis,” IPSN,
2005.
[28] X. Tang and J. Xu, “Extending network lifetime for
precision-constrained data aggregation in wireless sensor
networks,” INFOCOM, 2006.
[29] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Secure Hierarchical
In-Network Aggregation in Sensor Networks,” In Proc. of
ACM CCS, November 2006.
[30] J. Girao, D. Westhoff, and M. Schneider, “CDA: Concealed
Data Aggregation for Reverse Multicast Traffic in Wireless
Sensor Networks,” in 40th International Conference on
Communications, IEEE ICC, May 2005.
[31] B. Pinkas, “Cryptographic techniques for privacy preserving
data mining,” SIGKDD Explorations, vol. 4, no. 2, pp.
12–19, 2002.
[32] W. Du and M. J. Atallah, “Secure multi-party computation
problems and their applications: A review and open
problems,” in Proceedings of the 2001 Workshop on New
Security Paradigms. Cloudcroft, NM: ACM Press,
September 2001, pp. 13–22.
[33] M. Kantarcioglu and C. Clifton, “Privacy-preserving
distributed mining of association rules on horizontally
partitioned data,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and
Data Engineering, vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 1026–1037, 2004.
[34] A. C. Yao, “Protocols for secure computations,” in 23rd
IEEE Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science
(FOCS), 1982, pp. 160–164.
[35] I. D. Ronald Cramer and S. Dziembowski, “On the
Complexity of Verifiable Secret Sharing and Multiparty
Computation,” in Proceedings of the thirty-second annual
ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 2000, pp.
325–334.
[36] J. Halpern and V. Teague, “Rational Secret Sharing and
Multiparty Computation,” in Proceedings of the thirty-sixth
annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 2004, pp.
623–632.
